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Abstract
The electronics used in the data readout and triggering system for the Com-
pact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)
particle accelerator at CERN are exposed to high radiation levels. This ra-
diation can cause permanent damage to the electronic circuitry, as well as
temporary effects such as data corruption induced by Single Event Upsets.
Once the High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) accelerator upgrades are com-
pleted it will have five times higher instantaneous luminosity than LHC,
allowing for detection of rare physics processes, new particles and interac-
tions. Tests have been performed to determine the effects of radiation on the
electronic components to be used for the Endcap Muon electronics project
currently being designed for installation in the CMS experiment in 2013.
During these tests the digital components on the test boards were operat-
ing with active data readout while being irradiated with 55 MeV protons.
In reactor tests, components were exposed to 30 years equivalent levels of
neutron radiation expected at the HL-LHC. The highest total ionizing dose
(TID) for the muon system is expected at the inner-most portion of the CMS
detector, with 8900 rad over ten years. Our results show that Commercial
Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components selected for the new electronics will op-
erate reliably in the CMS radiation environment.
Preprint submitted to NIM August 21, 2012
1. Introduction
The Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment [1] is one of the two
large general-purpose experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC). The
purpose of this experiment is to understand the mechanism of electroweak
symmetry breaking responsible for generating masses of particles and search
for evidence of new physics, such as supersymmetry and extra dimensions.
The CMS detector is one of the most advanced particle detectors ever built,
and is comprised of several distinct systems. These include the silicon tracker,
electromagnetic calorimeter, hadronic calorimeter, super-conducting solenoid
and muon chambers. Working together, these systems identify particles as
well as measure their energy and momenta.
In order to maximize the amount of analyzable data, the beam intensity
of LHC will be increased, leading to five times higher data rate in CMS. With
this forthcoming High Luminosity LHC (HL-LHC) accelerator upgrade, the
Cathode Strip Chamber (CSC) muon detectors [2] in the CMS endcap will
require new electronics to handle the increased rate while maintaining high
data collection efficiency.
The increased rate of collisions will also raise the radiation level experi-
enced by the CMS data readout and trigger electronics. Such exposure results
in both cumulative effects and Single Event Upsets (SEUs) that degrade the
performance of silicon circuits. The electronic components used in building
the new CSC data readout and trigger system must be designed to reliably
handle the high data rate while operating in a high radiation environment.
Therefore it is necessary to determine which commercial electronic com-
ponents are safe for high luminosity operation in the CMS environment, and
this intial study addresses the most critical concerns in a series of tests that
were carried out in the Radiation Effects Facility at Texas A&M Univer-
sity (TAMU) Cyclotron Institute and at the TAMU Nuclear Science Center
(NSC). The K500 cyclotron at TAMU provides a proton beam with 55 MeV
energy, while the reactor at the NSC provides neutrons with energy up to
a few MeV. A similar study was made elsewhere [3] in 2001 to evaluate the
components currently used by the CSC system in the first phase of LHC
running.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we
describe the components of the new electronics for the CSC system. In section
3, we review the expected CMS radiation levels. The radiation testing setups
for digital and non-digital components are discussed in section 4. Results and
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conclusions are presented in sections 5 and 6, respectively.
2. Design Considerations for New Cathode Strip Chamber Elec-
tronics
The CSCs are a critical component of CMS that are used to identify
and measure momentum of muons passing through the detector in the most
forward region. The electronics used to collect CSC data must be capable
of handling the high data rate and withstand the radiation environment in
the CMS endcap. New electronics are being designed to replace the existing
electronics for the innermost region of the CSC system, specifically the 36
“ME1/1” chambers on each endcap. The design includes improvements in
data transmission and logic capability to ensure efficient performance.
There are three primary components of the ME1/1 CSC electronics be-
ing replaced; Cathode Front End Boards (CFEB), Trigger Motherboards
(TMB) and Data Motherboards (DMB). These last two types are custom
VME boards [4] that operate in an electronics crate a few meters away from
the CSCs to which they are connected. All of these boards are constructed
using Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) electronic components such as FP-
GAs, voltage regulators etc. The CFEBs provide digitized strip data from a
CSC; the TMB receives a coarse sampling of this data to perform fast pattern
matching and generates a signal to trigger the readout of the detector when
it determines that a muon track has passed through the CSC. When that
trigger signal is received by the CFEBs, the fully digitized muon track data
is sent to the DMB, and then on to the CMS central data acquisition and
storage system. The continued high level of efficiency in the system depends
upon implementation of new algorithms in these boards, which requires im-
provements such as new, powerful FPGAs and new optical data links in order
to handle the increased rate of data.
Maintaining high efficiency in the system also requires increased segmen-
tation of the chamber electronics. In the current configuration of CSCs, each
of the innermost (and the highest rate) muon chambers carry five CFEBs,
which are read out via copper cables. In the new design there will be seven
new high-performance “Digital CFEBs” per chamber, which will reduce the
duty factor for each board, eliminate dead-time, and improve processing ef-
ficiency. Geometrical constraints make large copper cables unsuitable for
this expansion to seven CFEBs, and optical links are the only viable read-
out alternative. Furthermore, improved logic capability is required for all
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three board types to handle the additional data channels; this is addressed
by utilizing modern FPGAs with increased logic and memory resources.
Radiation effects must be considered in the design process as these can
cause electronics malfunctions. The most significant effects to consider in
the CMS endcap fall into two general categories: Single event effects and
cumulative effects. Single event effects can occur as a Single Event Upset
(SEU) or as a latchup condition. SEUs are transient disruptions in digital
circuits, causing no permanent damage; they are easily recoverable by simply
writing or resetting the logic registers. However, a high rate of such errors can
cause unacceptable levels of dead time and reduce efficiency of the system,
so it is important to quantify the rate of SEUs expected for each component.
Unlike an SEU, a latchup condition can cause permanent chip failure.
Latchup is generally characterized by a large increase in current drawn by
a chip, and the subsequent overheating can burn out elements in the sili-
con. Occurences such as this would require a time consuming intervention
to replace the damaged parts, so it is important to design the CSC electron-
ics with components that are not susceptible to latchup in the CMS endcap
environment.
Cumulative effects are permanent incremental damage attributed to total
ionizing dose (TID) or displacement damage, which degrades the performance
of silicon circuits over time [5]. Several components were tested in this study
with different manufacturing technologies, and there are inherent differences
in their susceptibility to cumulative effects. This study makes no attempt
to distinguish between TID and displacement damage failures, but the fi-
nal results on performance will be used to determine which components are
likely to survive the radiation environment in the CMS endcap. Any COTS
components found to be unsatisfactory for any reason will not be used in the
new design.
Single event effects are caused by hadronic interactions in the silicon that
change the logical state of a digital circuit1. In the CMS endcap environment,
at least 90% of these are caused by neutrons with energy above 20 MeV [6].
The authors in [6] note that for energy above 20 MeV, the upset suscepibility
in silicon is equivalent for protons and neutrons. Thus, for digital compo-
1We distinguish digital parts by their fundamental function, in that they primarily
handle binary information data, although in some cases they may be mixed internally
with analog elements.
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nents, both TID/displacement damage as well as SEU and latchup suscepti-
bility can be evaluated at the same time using a cyclotron beam that provides
protons with energy greater than 20 MeV. However, for the non-digital com-
ponents in the CSC system the biggest concern is TID/displacement damage,
so exposure to neutrons with energy around 1 MeV from a nuclear reactor is
largely sufficient as a measure of their radiation tolerance.
The measurements made in this study show the impact of SEUs in dif-
ferent components; e.g. most errors in the optical receivers are transient,
affecting only a single data word with little overall significance, but a com-
plex component like an FPGA may require a reset for SEU recovery, and
this causes dead time. Information about the SEUs rates and the impact
of any recovery action are combined for use as input in determining where
mitigation is required in the system. These factors are discussed individually
for each part later in the description of test results.
Figure 1: Energy spectrum of neutron exposure for the innermost chambers of the CSC
system, based on simulations from the first phase of LHC operation [7].
Survivability is also important, and the requirements for this are dis-
cussed further in the next section. However, TID and displacement damage
results for digital components are not included here, as the flux of the TAMU
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cyclotron was not sufficient to accumulate significant dose2. Similarly, the
non-digital parts were not tested for SEU sensitivity due to the large sample
of initial candidates; however, the best candidates determined in this study
will be subject to additional power-on tests in the future to verify their tol-
erance to SEUs as well as cumulative effects.
3. CSC Radiation Level In CMS
ME1/1 CSCs are the innermost chambers within CMS and are exposed
to the highest rate of radiation damage, largely from neutrons. Figure 1
shows the simulated energy spectrum of neutrons crossing the ME1/1 region;
figure 2 shows how the neutron fluence in the endcap region is expected to
vary with distance from the beam line. In the area of highest neutron flux, the
total fluence for neutrons with energy E>100 keV is about 6×1011 cm−2 [7],
and the TID is 1780 rad over ten years of normal LHC operation. However,
for HL-LHC these rates are expected to be five times higher, as summarized in
table 1. These data form the baseline for determining the radiation tolerance
of the CSC electronics.
Ten Year HL-LHC Exposure in ME1/1
20 MeV neutron fluence 2.7× 1011 n/cm2
1 MeV neutron fluence 3.0× 1012 n/cm2
total ionizing dose 8.9 krad
Table 1: Summary of expected neutron exposure in the ME1/1 region of the CMS endcap
for ten years of HL-LHC operation.
4. Radiation Testing Setup
Radiation tests were performed separately for digital and non-digital com-
ponents at the TAMU cyclotron and the NSC to determine their radiation
tolerance. The testing facilities, equipment and setup are discussed for both
digital and non-digital components under sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. A
special distinction is made for digital components as they have a significant
susceptibility to SEU errors in data handling and control logic.
2Full TID/displacement damage testing for digital components is planned for a future
study.
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Figure 2: Expected neutron fluence in the Station 1 region of the CMS endcap for the
first phase of LHC operation, shown as a function of the distance from the beam line [7].
4.1. Digital Components
The proposed CSC electronics replacement introduces several new digital
devices to the system that require testing. These include the Xilinx Virtex 6
FPGAs, the Finisar duplex opto-coupler, Reflex Photonics Snap12 simplex
receiver and transmitter opto-couplers, and the TI SN74CB3T bus exchange
level shifter. A printed circuit board containing these components was devel-
oped and assembled (fig. 3) as a test bed for the measurements of radiation
tolerance. During the board design, special attention was given to the lo-
cation of the parts on the board, allowing sufficient space for a collimated
beam to irradiate each component one-by-one with no overlap.
In this study the digital components were tested for SEU sensitivity3.
SEUs are caused primarily by neutrons with energy above 20 MeV, and the
fluence of such neutrons in the ME1/1 region of the CMS endcap is expected
to be 2.7 × 1011 cm−2 over ten years of HL-LHC running. However, for the
purpose of this test it is only necessary to observe enough SEUs to make a
3These digital parts are primarily CMOS components that should be less sensitive to
damage at the moderate levels of radiation exposure expected at HL-LHC. However, the
beam flux available in this study was not sufficient to prove their survivability, so the
TID/displacement damage tolerance must be fully evaluated with additional testing.
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Virtex-6 FPGA & PROMs QPLL
SNAP-12 Fiber Receiver
    - Fibers from 7 CFEBs
SNAP-12 Fiber Transmitter
    - For testing only
I/O Voltage Level Shifters
   - 3.3 V to 2.5 V
PCB Dimensions: 7.5” wide by 5.9’’ high
    - 11 mm clearance from main TMB board
Finisar Fiber Transciever
    - For testing only
Figure 3: Top-side view of a TMB mezzanine test board, as used in SEU tests for digital
components.
statistically signifiacnt measurement of the SEU cross sections. To accom-
plish this, the total number of observed operational errors for each component
were counted (regardless of mechanism) while they were exposed in a con-
trolled proton beam. These functional SEU cross section measurements are
then used to evaluate the SEU sensitivity for each part and determine the
level of error mitigation that may be required.
The TAMU cyclotron provided a 55 MeV proton beam with a flux as high
as 3×107 cm−2s−1, and uniform across the 1.5 inch diameter beam spot. The
flux measurements were made using system of scintillation counters and a
Faraday cup, providing a precision better than 1%. A movable platform was
used to support the TMB mezzanine test boards in perpendicular orientation
with respect to the beam line, and programmable stops were set for the
location of each device under test (DUT) to ensure alignment in the beam.
Two samples were tested for each of the digital COTS components planned
for use in the new CSC electronics.
System checks were performed just before irradiating each board to verify
that the power was stable and the SEU error monitoring system (described
below) was operational. Beam intensity for each DUT began with a base level
flux of 1 × 107 cm−2s−1. The SEU rate was monitored during the first few
minutes of each DUT exposure, and the beam flux was adjusted as needed
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to attain a suitable rate of SEUs, typically up to ten per minute. Each DUT
was exposed for 45 to 90 minutes in the beam. Power supply currents were
monitored for signs of latchup during exposure.
A sophisticated error monitoring system was developed, using custom
firmware and software, in order to detect the occurrence of SEUs and to reli-
ably identify the exact element that failed among the several different digital
components mounted on the TMB mezzanine test board. The specific tests
employed in each case are described individually in the “Results” section, but
every error event detected was automatically verified in real-time by perform-
ing multiple readbacks from the hardware to collect information associated
with the SEU event, and checking it for consistency in the software. For ex-
ample, errors in the Block RAMs (programmed as ROMs) usually involved
one or more bit flips, and in these cases the memory was read back again
to confirm that there was bad data in the memory, and not a transmission
error. All the information about each SEU event was saved in a log file for
later review, including a time stamp, the error data, what the data should
have been, and which test condition was activated by the SEU.
4.2. Non-Digital Components
There are several non-digital components required in the new CSC elec-
tronics, such as voltage regulators and diodes which are necessary for pro-
viding power to the digital components. Custom designed voltage regulator
test boards were assembled (fig. 4) for testing the performance of multiple
samples for each component.
Based on the radiation exposure calculations for HL-LHC, the electronics
mounted on ME1/1 chambers must withstand 1 MeV neutron fluence of
3×1012 cm−2 and about 9 krad total dose over ten years. To account for the
uncertainties in these calculations, a safety factor of three times the expected
levels was imposed, and these radiation tests extend beyond 30 krad.
The Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center supports a 1 Megawatt TRIGA
reactor that serves as an ideal environment to determine those parts which
are suitable for use in the CSC electronics project. The voltage regulator test
boards received an initial exposure for one hour at 6 kilowatt reactor power,
with a 1 MeV neutron flux of 9.9×108 cm−2s−1; a few weeks later they were
exposed for an additional two hours at same reactor power. The accumulated
radiation exposure levels correspond to 10 and 30 HL-LHC years respectively
(approximately 10 krad and 30 krad), and the total neutron fluence was
10.7× 1012 cm−2.
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Figure 4: One of the voltage regulator test boards that was exposed to 1 MeV neutrons
in the TAMU NSC reactor.
5. Results
This section provides a description for each type of component tested and
explains the procedures used to carry out the tests in each case; an overview
of the test configuration used for the digital components is shown in figure 5.
For the non-digital parts, each was tested with dedicated load resistors tuned
to emulate the realistic conditions for normal CMS operation. Results are
presented for SEU susceptibility and radiation survivability, based on mea-
surements such as SEU counts, voltage levels, total fluence and the dose
during each exposure.
It was noted that a few SEUs were observed in the FPGA during exposure
of other components, likely caused by backscatter from the beam. These kind
of SEUs were clearly distinguished in the error monitoring system and they
were allocated to the appropriate SEU category. Furthermore, the rate of
these was very low, causing less than 1% of all SEUs, so the overall impact
on the SEU test results is negligible.
Power supply currents were monitored during exposure and no changes
were observed, which is evidence that no latchup occurred in this study.
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Figure 5: Diagram of the test circuits used on the TMB mezzanine test boards, indicating
the five digital devices tested in the TAMU cyclotron.
5.1. Snap12 Receiver/Transmitter: Reflex Photonics SN-R12-C01001/T12-
C01001
The Snap12 transmitter and receiver are used to transfer data through 12
independent optical channels. For the model tested, each channel is capable
of operating at 6.25 Gb/s through 300 m of fiber optic cable at a wavelength
of 850 nm. The transmitter converts 12 electrical signals into fiber optic
signals, while the receiver performs reversed conversion. In most cases, the
new CSC electronics will not utilize all 12 of these links; only 6 were tested
on each board in this test.
During the test, the FPGA was programmed to use a Pseudo-Random
Bit Generator (PRBG) to create randomized data, and transmit the data
at 3.2 Gb/s through the Snap12 devices. The Snap12 fibers were physically
looped-back from the output (transmit) port to an input (receive) port with a
15 m long MTP fiber ribbon cable. The FPGA received the data and checked
for differences against what was sent; six such fiber circuits were operated
in parallel for this test. Any discrepancy between transmitted and received
data was identified as an SEU, and a count was made of such occurrences.
These counts were read out from the FPGA via a gigabit Ethernet (GbE)
link to a PC and monitored by software at 1 sec intervals. Software recorded
time stamp information associated with each incremental error.
Test results for Snap12 receiver and transmitter are shown in table 2. The
typical SEU failure mode was due to bit errors in a single data word. In HL-
LHC these transient errors will occur at a low rate, with only about one per
week on each receiver channel and almost zero errors from the transmitters,
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so no mitigation is needed for the Snap12 components.
5.2. Optical Transceiver: Finisar FTLF8524E2GNL
Optical transceivers are used to build high-speed data links over multi-
mode fiber optics. The Finisar component selected for the new electronics is
bidirectional and can operate at rates up to 4.25 Gb/s.
For radiation testing, the FPGA was programmed to send GbE packets
carrying randomized data through the Finisar. The fiber was physically con-
nected to a commercial PCI gigabit Ethernet card in the test control PC,
and the data packet integrity was tested using a cyclic redundancy check [8].
After each packet was checked, a new packet was transmitted. Any discrep-
ancy between transmitted and received data packets was considered an SEU,
and such error instances were counted.
In cases of persistent error the test operator issued a system reset; if not
resolved by a reset, the operator turned off the power supply for five seconds,
then resumed testing. A power cycle was required a total of eight times due
to the loss of the data link on the Tx channel. No change in current was
observed, so an SEU in the transmit enable circuit seems the likely cause
rather than latchup. The cross section of this occurence is 5.9 × 10−11 cm2
which corresponds to about 1.5 times per year for each Finisar component
during real operations at CMS. While this is rate is acceptable for use in the
new system, it will be investigated further in a future study to verify the
cause of the problem and to establish a reliable mechanism for mitigation.
The test result summary for the Finisar is shown in table 2. However,
deeper analysis of the errors shows that the rate of SEU induced bit errors
scales with the rate of packets transmitted on the GbE link. Rescaling this
SEU crosss section for the worst-case data load expected at HL-LHC increases
it to 4.5×10−8 cm2 which corresponds to about seven errors per day on each
link during real operation at CMS. This is less than the typical industry
standard for bit errors on gigabit links of one error per 10 trillion bits, and
such low rate of transient bit errors is acceptable in CMS with no need for
mitigation.
5.3. Bus Exchange Level Shifter: Texas Instruments SN74CB3T16212
While newer electronics used for the CSC project rely on 2.5 V technology,
they must also communicate with some older 3.3 V components in the system.
This is a concern for the Virtex 6 FPGA which is limited to 2.5 V signal levels.
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To keep the chip safe, the voltage level of the incoming signals to the FPGA
must be reduced to 2.5 V using the TI level shifter.
To test these chips for SEU susceptibility, the FPGA was programmed
to transmit randomized data patterns through the DUT. A set of outgoing
FPGA data lines were electrically looped back into the level shifter input
port using a customized circuit board. The data then passed from the level
shifter to the FPGA, where it was checked for differences against what was
sent. As each received word was checked, a new word was transmitted, at
80 MHz clock frequency. As above, any discrepancy between transmitted
and received data words was identified as an SEU; the FPGA counted such
instances in an internal register, which was accessed at 1 sec intervals via
GbE link to a PC. Software recorded the time stamp and other information
associated with each error. Since no errors were observed, the test results
shown in table 2 are the upper limits on the SEU cross section at 90 %
confidence level.
5.4. Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA: XC6V195T-2FFG1156CES
Virtex 6 is one of the most advanced FPGAs available, containing many
specialized built-in-silicon modules, and it requires several voltage supplies
to operate, ranging from 1.0 V to 2.5 V. Having more logic resources than
previous models, this FPGA is capable of processing data more efficiently.
It also has dedicated memory blocks and multi-gigabit transceiver “GTX”
blocks. Using the TAMU cyclotron, two Virtex 6 chips were tested and the
results for the embedded silicon modules are indicated in table 2. The FPGA
firmware design for these tests utilized 11 out of 20 GTX blocks, 74% of the
Block RAMs, and 38% of the FPGA Configurable Logic Blocks (CLBs).
In order to measure the maximum level of FPGA sensitivity to SEUs, no
SEU mitigation logic was implemented during the tests, and every error was
counted as an SEU, regardless of the mechanism causing it4.
The FPGA CLBs and Block RAM memories were configured as ROMs
and preloaded with known sets of randomized data. These ROMs were re-
peatedly read out to a PC using a GbE link, and data checks were performed
in software. Discrepancies found in the data were identified as SEUs; the
software saved the information associated with each error in a log file (in-
cluding time stamp, the identity of the wrong bits and the raw data itself)
4There is no distinction made between SEUs in the logic fabric and the configuration
memory of the FPGA; any error detected in FPGA function is counted as an SEU.
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and notified the test operator that a system reset was required to recover the
corrupted ROM. Resets were controlled manually by push button.
The FPGA GTX tests occurred in parallel with FPGA logic and memory
testing5 during FPGA proton beam exposure. Custom error monitoring tools
were used to independently track the different types of errors. Test results
for all of the Virtex-6 FPGA components are shown in table 2.
Analysis of the recorded SEU events showed that in most cases, the ob-
served Block RAM errors differed from the original preloaded patterns by
a single bit. In cases with differences in more that one bit, the corruption
could be attributed to the inversion of a single bit in the logic fabric of the
FPGA used for Block RAM control.
Component tested
Board 1 Board 2 Average Expected SEU
SEU σ(×10−11cm2) SEU σ(×10−11cm2) σavg(×10
−11cm2) Rate at CMS
Finisar 6 8 ± 3 8 13 ± 5 10 ± 3 3/year/chip
Snap12 Tx 6 9 ± 3 3 6 ± 3 7 ± 2 < 1/year/link
Snap12 Rx 278 850 ± 50 311 790 ± 50 820 ± 30 4/month/link
TI Level Shifter 0 < 4.0 0 < 3.0 < 1.7 0
FPGA-GTX 52 80 ± 10 39 70 ± 10 76 ± 8 3/year/link
FPGA-CLB 40 3800 ± 600 22 3600 ± 800 3700 ± 500 6/day/chip
FPGA-Bram 61 5800 ± 700 34 5500 ± 900 5700 ± 600 9/day/chip
Table 2: Number of SEUs observed for each component during proton irradiation and the
resulting cross sections. The last column shows the expected rate of SEUs during HL-LHC
operation for each device if no mitigation is implemented.
The measured GTX error rate is relatively low, with only three transient
errors expected per year on each link at Hl-LHC, so no dedicated mitigation is
required for these elements of the FPGA. However, the Block RAM and CLB
logic error rate is significant, with several errors expected per chip every day.
Block RAM errors can be mitigated using the error detection and correction
features embedded in the FPGA. CLB logic errors must be mitigated by
implementing triple module redundancy, where voting is used to correct bit
errors. The effectiveness of these methods is to be tested in a future study.
5.5. Voltage Regulators
Eleven different voltage regulator models from five different manufactur-
ers were mounted on custom-designed voltage regulator test boards (fig. 4).
The boards were placed in the large-sample irradiation chamber, and they
were not powered during exposure. The voltage, current and temperature
5These are separate test modules in the firmware operating simultaneously in the
FPGA, and the errors for each are tracked individually.
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performance of each circuit was tested before and after each exposure in
order to determine their radiation tolerance. At least two samples of each
regulator were tested, and consistent pattern was observed in the results.
In figure 6, a representative sample of results from five different regula-
tors is shown. The vertical axis represents the ratio of the measured voltage
(after exposure) to the pre-exposure voltage; the horizontal axis shows the
measurements taken in 30-minute time intervals after each radiation expo-
sure. Observing a constant result with value ≈ 1 over time indicates that the
regulator is a stable, reliable choice for our design. As seen from the figure,
several regulators break down after exposure and fail to regulate; some of
the samples perform well after the first 10 krad exposure, and then fail after
the final 20 krad exposure. Some chips show a small degree of recovery over
time, but they remain outside of the acceptable performance range of ±5%
voltage variation.
Three of the six Max8557ETE regulators showed 0 V output after the
second exposure, while the other three show approximately 3% decrease in
voltage. This is the only observed case of complete failure for a regulator
due to radiation. Several other regulators showed more than 5% change in
voltage, and regardless of the mechanism, these are all unacceptable for use
in CSC electronics.
The following regulator models demonstrated performance degradation
to varying degrees and do not show the tolerance required for use in CMS:
· Maxim 8557ETE (p);
· Sharp PQ05VY053ZZH, PQ035ZN1H2PH, and PQ070XZ02ZPH;
· TI TPS75601KTT (p) and TPS75901 (p).
where (p) indicates parts manufactured with p-channel MOSFETs.
About half of the tested regulator models showed no significant change
in performance, and these voltage regulators were determined to be suitable
for use in the new CSC electronics6:
· National Semi LP38501-ADJ (n) and LP38853S-ADJ (n);
6The initial sample size of regulators was too broad for efficient evaluation of SEU
tolerance at the TAMU cyclotron, but this will be addressed for the surviving candidates
in a future study.
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· TI TPS74901KTWR (n);
· MIC69502WR and MIC49500WU.
where (n) indicates parts manufactured with n-channel MOSFETs.
This reduced set of suitable candidates will undergo further testing in the
future to verify their tolerance to SEUs and cumulative effects under power.
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Figure 6: Examples of voltage regulator output stability after each radiation exposure,
showing the change in voltage output for regulators that survived the full exposure level.
After each exposure the output voltages were measured under power at 30 minute intervals.
Voltage regulator deviations greater than 5% are not acceptable for CSC electronics.
5.6. ST Micro and ON Semi Diodes: 1N5819
The CSC low voltage supply system utilizes 1N5819 diodes for power sup-
ply protection, and these need testing just as the other silicon components.
Ten samples of these diodes from two different manufacturers were tested in
conjunction with the voltage regulator tests. Performance testing was done
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before and after each exposure. The performance validation circuit used a
7.67 V DC supply with a series resistor of 7.5 Ω that was connected through
the diode to ground. Each diode test consisted of two trials: one with forward
bias and another with reverse bias. A small voltage drop across each diode
was observed in the forward trials, as shown in table 3; in the reverse direc-
tion there was zero current through the circuit. All diodes showed consistent
diode properties after neutron irradiation, with essentially no degradation
from the radiation.
PRE RAD. POST RAD. I POST RAD. II
Manufacturer Vfwd (V ) Vfwd (V ) Vfwd (V )
ST Micro 0.413 0.421 0.413
ON Semi 0.391 0.395 0.388
Table 3: Average measurements of the forward diode voltages before and after each expo-
sure.
6. Conclusion
Several COTS components planned for use in the CSC electronics project
were tested at the TAMU Cyclotron Institute and the TAMU Nuclear Sci-
ence Center reactor. Radiation tolerant power handling components were
identified that are likely to be suitable for use in the CMS Endcap Muon
system. Some unsuitable components were also identified during these tests.
SEU susceptibility was measured for several digital components. The
results show that most of these parts will not need SEU mitigation in the
CMS endcap environment during HL-LHC operation; however, the need for
mitigation was identified for the logic and memory elements in the Xilinx
Virtex-6 FPGA.
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